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Abstract 
 
This paper introduces the term liminality as a way of understanding the dynamics behind temporal, increased surveillance during 
events. Liminal surveillance mediates existing surveillance systems and reveals how surveillance technologies can be stretched 
and twisted. The empirical, ethnographic data that is presented in this paper was collected in the emergency control room during 
Unofficial St. Patrick’s Day, a local student event on the campus of the University of Illinois at Urbana/Champaign. Two 
surveillance technologies in use are central: CCTV and social media. The paper concludes that liminal surveillance enabled the 
authorities to isolate their surveillance and patrol related to the festival from regular policing activities. The event legitimized new 
surveillance practices and the increased use of CCTV and social media. After the event, surveillance returned to normal. 
However, the liminal surveillance has had a legacy: the use of surveillance technologies on campus will continue to grow in the 
years to come. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Events like festivals, parades, and sports tournaments are social phenomena that disrupt normal social 
patterns. Sporting mega events like the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup, for example, are 
symbolic, global affairs that promote cities, catalyze huge infrastructure projects and unite visitors from 
all over the world (Boyle and Haggerty 2009). Festivals organized on a smaller, local scale are 
characterized by more community-oriented social interactions. An example is Burning Man, an annual 
festival based on radical self-expression in the Nevada desert. 
 
What these events have in common is that they attract people who want to break away from everyday life 
in order to experience a kind of solidarity that is stronger than in normal situations. Events are risky 
endeavors, not least because of the possible unpredictable behavior of the people taking part. For 
authorities, they are ‘planned disasters’ that demand strict security measures. At a deeper level, authorities 
see them as ‘policy windows’ (Kingdon 1995) in order to implement security and surveillance measures 
they already had in mind (Boyle and Haggerty 2009; Bennett and Haggerty 2011; Giulianotti and Klauser 
2011; Samatas 2007, 2008, 2011; Fussey and Coaffee 2011). For example, authorities in Greece installed 
more than 1,200 cameras for the Olympics in Athens for safety reasons and crowd control, which resulted 
in increased surveillance after the Games were over as well (Samatas 2007, 2008). Surveillance systems 
introduced at (mega) events have the tendency to expand and be used for reasons other than those for 
which they were intended (Bennett and Haggerty 2011). That is why mega events are important research 
sites for surveillance scholars. 
 
Smaller, more local events, such as annual festivals and parades, are less well studied in the context of 
security and surveillance. However, they are, like mega events, increasingly framed in these terms by local 
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authorities and law enforcement. Given the smaller scale and available budgets it is less likely that 
completely new surveillance infrastructures will be installed. Instead, existing surveillance technologies 
such as closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems—if available—will be employed for the safety and 
security measures of the local event. In other words, the local event will temporally disrupt established, 
routine, and ‘normal’ surveillance practices. 
 
Hoover (2008), who studied the Burning Man festival, and Van Heerden (2011), who published an article 
on the local Klein Karoo National Arts Festival in South Africa, introduced the term liminality to unravel 
the characteristics of events. Events take place in times that are set apart from the day-to-day routine when 
explicit and implicit rules that “governed the everyday utilization of public space and social interaction in 
the host towns [are] adapted or transgressed” (Van Heerden 2011: 65). Both Hoover and Van Heerden 
refer to safety and security aspects, yet pay less attention to the increasing security measurements and 
surveillance implemented during local events. 
 
This paper aims to contribute to the discussion on events and surveillance to further develop the concept 
of liminal surveillance. Studying surveillance as liminality will tell us a lot about its dynamics, because: 
 
- liminal periods and circumstances (e.g. local events) mediate the evolution of existing 
surveillance systems; 
- liminal surveillance shows us how surveillance can be stretched and twisted, a 
mechanism know in surveillance studies as function creep (Lyon 2007). 
 
In this paper, the surveillance practice occurring during the local student event, Unofficial St. Patrick’s 
Day—in short, Unofficial—at the campus of the University of Illinois at Urbana/Champaign, USA, is 
central. The aim of the paper is not to research and question the legitimation, effectiveness, and outcomes 
(Phillips 1999) of increased surveillance as such. Instead, it aims to understand the mechanisms behind 
liminal surveillance and how it affects and mediates actual surveillance practices. It does so by presenting 
the observed actions and interactions of the authorities in an emergency control room setting.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in the first section the concept of liminal surveillance 
is worked out in detail. Four dimensions will be introduced in order to enhance the analytical content of 
the concept. Sections two and three present the setting of the study (the control room) and elaborate on the 
methodology and methods used for data collection (ethnography). These sections are used to reflect on the 
surveillance literature and to contextualize the actual surveillance practices. Next, the empirical part of the 
paper will present in detail the particularities of liminal surveillance during the event, Unofficial. Two 
surveillance technologies used during the event are central: CCTV and social media. In the final 
discussion and concluding sections the introduced dimensions of liminal surveillance serve as tools with 
which to draw out empirical and analytical insights. 
 
Liminal Surveillance: Concepts and Dimensions 
 
Liminality is a well-known theoretical concept in anthropology and cultural studies. It was introduced by 
Van Gennep (1960) and later extended by Turner (1964, 1969). Van Gennep used it to reflect upon a 
temporary and transitional period between two fixed and clearly separated phases or states of an individual 
during what he called a rite of passage: a pre-liminal phase of separation, a phase of liminality (e.g. the 
adolescence), and a post-liminal phase of aggregation. Turner adopted and further developed the concept: 
for him, liminality not only referred to a phase or space in a rite of passage, but it could describe any 
condition or state that put an individual ‘betwixt and between’ general societal norms. 
 
Turner also argued that liminality could occur in non-ritual spheres, such as entertainment, in youth and 
counter-cultures, and during festivals (Tzanelli 2007). These phenomena take place in modern, 
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industrialized societies and tend to result in the same, anti-structure patterns that pre-modern rituals 
follow. However, they don’t result (necessarily) in transformations of social norms and rules: things (can) 
go back to ‘normal’ after the liminal event. Moreover, Turner argued that rituals in the pre-modern society 
were necessary, whereas the participation in a liminal event in modern societies is a matter of choice. For 
Turner these differences warranted the introduction of the term ‘liminoid’ (Turner 1982). Liminoid is a 
quasi-liminality and refers to betwixt and between phenomena that are not ritual, more open, and based on 
voluntary participation. In order to avoid confusion, however, the more familiar concept of liminality will 
be used throughout this paper (for this argument see Van Heerden 2011: 56). 
 
Liminality has been used, although not very often, in Surveillance Studies. Examples are surveillance in 
border regions (Zureik and Salter 2005) and the use of cameras in casinos (Schwartz 1995/2002). In these 
studies liminality refers to the places and spaces where surveillance is carried out (i.e. borders and 
casinos). However, the point of this paper is that it is not only the event/space that is ‘betwixt and 
between’, but also the surveillance that takes place. Liminal surveillance is the targeted, temporarily 
intensified use of a surveillance system for the safety and security management of a particular social 
event. 
 
It is well known in Surveillance Studies that surveillance systems are characterized by increases and 
decreases in use (see Goold 2004). The term liminal surveillance offers the opportunity to further 
investigate the underlying dynamics. Liminal surveillance cannot be reduced to the intensified monitoring 
of unwanted behavior. Instead it is multi-dimensional. Based on Turner’s work, I distinguish four key 
dimensions of liminal surveillance: 
 
1) Time-space: liminal surveillance is temporal and situational. The temporal element in this dimension 
can be related to moments of increased surveillance. The space refers to the unique setting in which 
the surveillance is situated. Unofficial takes place at a local university campus: a creative space, but 
one that is also vulnerable to criminal behavior. The surveillance measures implemented by local 
officials—including the use of cameras on campus (Walby 2006)—must be seen in the context of 
campus safety and crime (Brantingham and Brantingham 1994; Fisher 1995; Wilson and Wilson 
2011).  
2) Normative: liminal surveillance defines what can be seen as legitimate and possible. During the 
period of structural erase (i.e. during the event) novel configurations of ideas and norms arise (Van 
Heerden 2011). This is not only true for the participants or the ‘initiates’ of the event, but also for the 
authorities overseeing it. Law enforcement can use surveillance techniques in other ways than in 
normal conditions, for example, because politicians temporarily increase resources (i.e. budgets and 
facilities) and support intensified surveillance. 
3) Social: liminal surveillance creates new partnerships. The local event, Unofficial, can be framed as an 
‘in-between-ness’ during which the students stray from their normal routines and are able to 
experience communitas, a term is used by Turner (1969) to describe the experience of ‘togetherness’ 
that people can experience during the liminal phase. Again, the people who experience communitas 
during events are not only the initiates (students), but other actors as well, such as fire fighters and 
law enforcement. 
4) Power: liminal surveillance disrupts normal social patterns but does not result in a power-vacuum. 
Liminal experiences give participants opportunity (i.e. the power) to remold themselves and society, 
and transcend structural constraints on the basis of their collective experience (Yang 2000). At the 
same time, because of the threat to the status quo and possible de-stabilization, liminality will lead to 
(new) forms control in disciplining individuals (Swartz 2007; Andrews and Roberts 2012). That is 
why the study of liminal events cannot be reduced to understanding pleasure and leisure. Danger, 
risk, and the reduction of risk are integral part of the discourses on events (Shields 1990). 
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Control Room Ethnography 
 
The analysis of liminal surveillance in this paper concerns the practices in the emergency operations 
center (the control room) during Unofficial in 2012. This puts the paper in the tradition of interpretative 
qualitative research into (CCTV) emergency control rooms (e.g. Norris and Armstrong 1999b; Smith 
2007; Monahan 2007) and—more broadly defined—in the paradigm of human-technology interaction in 
control rooms (Suchman 1987; Heath and Luff 1992). Control rooms are complex settings dedicated to the 
collection, clearing, and dissemination of information about a particular event or emergency. The control 
room operation is not a neutral practice: professionals working in these settings make sense of the 
information and negotiate the relevance of the information for their task. The work itself is mediated by 
(surveillance) technologies (Heath et al. 2000; Goodwin and Goodwin 1996). Two surveillance 
technologies within the emergency control room are central to this paper: CCTV and social media. 
 
Since the early 1990s, when CCTV cameras began to appear in the surveillance of urban space, scholars 
have called for attention to this phenomenon (Goold 2004; Norris et al. 2004; Webster 2004; Lett et al. 
2010; Doyle et al. 2011; Webster et al. 2012), theorizing it in terms of the Panopticon, Big Brother, 
surveillance assemblages, and the maximum surveillance society. Surveillance researchers studied the 
places and spaces of CCTV-surveillance, such as city centers (Coleman and Sim 2000; Martinais and 
Bétin 2004; Hier 2004; Zurawski 2007) and sporting mega events (Bennett and Haggerty 2011; 
Giulianotti and Klauser 2011). Research into the routines of CCTV operators in control rooms has always 
been an important part of CCTV research. Since the pioneering, ethnographic study by Norris and 
Armstrong (1999a, 1999b) many scholars have participated in control (CCTV) room settings (not to 
mention ethnographic research on CCTV outside the control room) (see for example: Crane and Dee 
2001; Goold 2004; Smith 2002, 2007; McCahill 2002; Newburn and Hayman 2002; Hempel and Töpfer 
2004; Sutton and Wilson 2004; Neyland 2006; Monahan 2007; Wagenaar and Boersma 2012). 
 
Although the control room studies differ in detail, researchers reported similar results (for a more 
elaborate overview see Smith 2007): a) CCTV operators tend to watch individuals on the basis of their 
race, color, posture, and clothing (prejudice), b) they watch people mainly because they belong to a group 
(usual suspects) or because they are in a particular location, c) sometimes they surveill individuals for no 
obvious reasons, d) voyeuristic behavior can easily become part of control room routines because 
watching CCTV images can become tedious and boring (called the CCTV ‘boredom factor’ by Smith 
2007; see also Ferenbok and Clement 2011). 
 
Due to what has been called the time/space distanciation in CCTV surveillance, it can be difficult for the 
operators to directly interpret the behavior of those who are monitored (Norris and McCahill 2006; Smith 
2007). CCTV researchers found that the camera images were useful (if at all) mostly in retrospect (i.e. 
after a particular event took place). Finally, (CCTV) control room research convincingly shows that the 
effectiveness of CCTV systems depends on the extent to which the system is integrated with other 
surveillance techniques (McCahill 2002; Smith 2002). 
 
The second surveillance technology studied during the event was social media. Control room surveillance 
is no longer limited to the use of camera images. Information posted on social media sites (surveillance 
and the new generation internet, Fuchs et al. 2011) plays an important role in control room settings and in 
crisis response in general. As social media becomes more persuasive, its use has implications for 
emergency response professionals (Palen 2008) who use it to make sense of the situation ‘out there’ and to 
create what they call an ‘operational picture’ (Boersma et al. 2012). Currently there is a lot of attention for 
the question of how emergency responders can use social media for their work (for example White 2012), 
yet little attention to the surveillance aspect of its use. 
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Social media sites that have ‘entered’ the emergency control room setting will increasingly become the 
loci for surveillance. The personal data and information put on social media websites by participants of 
local events is used by law enforcement to control their behavior. It can be seen as a classic example of 
what is coined ‘participatory surveillance’ by Albrechtslund (2008). Participants active online during a 
liminal event experience ‘virtual’ communitas (see Herwig 2009). At the same time, those who post 
messages and images on social media sites unknowingly provide information for policing activities. 
 
Methodology and Methods 
 
This paper is based on (organizational) ethnographic research, a growing research tradition in Surveillance 
Studies (Green and Zurawski 2013). Ethnography enables the researcher to combine observations, short 
conversations, more lengthy interviews, and documentary research into what can be called a ‘thick 
description’ (Geertz 1973; Hammersley and Atkinson 1995) of a particular social situation. Organizational 
ethnography is, as the term itself suggests, ethnographic research used for the understanding of 
organizational routines, practices, and norms. This type of methodology is not—per se—meant to uncover 
causal relationships, but rather used to deepen the understanding or the ‘Verstehen’ of actual practices. 
The prerequisite for this kind of research in the organization is being where the action is or, in more 
anthropological terms, doing research in-situ. In particular, ethnographic research focuses on the 
materiality (e.g. mediating technologies), actual practices and sense-making. Four vignettes will be 
presented in this paper to give in-depth examples of surveillance practices. 
 
This research into the surveillance practices in the operations center during Unofficial is part of a long, 
substantial research into the routines, communication patterns, networks, and cultures of emergency 
response organizations (including emergency control rooms) in the USA and Europe (Wagenaar et al. 
2009; Boersma et al. 2009, 2010; Wagenaar and Boersma 2012). During the event, the author was present 
in the operations center for about sixteen of the twenty hours in which the room was in full operation. 
Before the start of the observations the author was introduced to the highest ranking officials and the main 
aim, not the details, of the research was made explicit. The author was next to the operator of the CCTV 
system in the room. Part of the research included two bike rides on campus to get a sense of the 
atmosphere of the activities. The vast majority of the time was spent in the operations center, however, 
including lunch and dinner hours.  
 
The methods used during the research are typical for ethnographic research. The author observed the 
behavior of those present in the operations center while being a ‘fly on the wall’. In other words, there 
were no interruptions of the officers’ activities other than short informal conversations about their 
routines, organizational norms, opinions about the course of the event, and their past experiences with 
policing and surveillance. Before the event, short interviews were undertaken to get a better sense of 
Unofficial and the planned emergency response operations in order to better understand what was and 
would be going on. After the event the author held recorded interviews with key-actors. First of all, the 
author interviewed three police officers of the University of Illinois Police Department. Two of them were 
in the operations center during Unofficial, including the operator of the CCTV system. The other was on 
patrol during the event. The latter showed how he used an iPad to view CCTV images during patrol. Two 
recorded interviews were undertaken with a representative of the Illinois Fire Service Institute and one 
with the director of the Champaign County Emergency Operations Center. The author talked to the 
Champaign city official responsible for public information of the Champaign Fire Department and with 
the chief of the Campaign Fire Department. He also had two phone conversations with the bar-owner who 
initiated Unofficial activities some years ago. Finally the author had informal conversations with 
University of Illinois staff members. 
 
Published documents concerning previous events and reports about the outcome of surveillance by the 
University of Illinois Police Department and The Daily Illini were useful sources to frame and 
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contextualize Unofficial 2012. Finally, the data posted on social media websites, including Facebook, 
PicFog and Twitter, provided a wealth of information about student behavior and excitement during the 
event that otherwise would have been missed, although no systematic content-analysis of social media 
websites related to Unofficial was undertaken. 
 
The Event: Unofficial St. Patrick’s Day 
 
Since 1996, the first weekend of March at the University of Illinois at Urbana/Champaign has been called 
Unofficial St. Patrick’s Day or, in short, Unofficial. The ‘official’ St. Patrick’s Day is a cultural and 
religious holiday, celebrated internationally, commemorating St. Patrick and the day he arrived in Ireland. 
Starting as a Christian festival in the 17th century, it gradually grew into a celebration of Irish culture in a 
much broader sense. It has been popular in the USA since the late 18th century, when the Irish diaspora 
began organizing festivals. Later it became a holiday for non-Irish Northern Americans as well. The color 
of the festival is green, the Irish color: people wear green clothes during the festival, printed with 
shamrocks, a three- or four-leaved plant, the festival’s token. People, mostly students, wearing these 
clothes are called ‘the Greens’. At the University of Illinois at Urbana/Champaign the event is called 
Unofficial because St. Patrick’s Day, March 17, often falls during the university’s Spring break. Local bar 
owners took the initiative to replace the event to a weekend before the actual St. Patrick’s Day in order to 
secure their income. It grew into an annual local event attracting thousands of young people from outside 
the Twin Cities, as Urbana and Champaign are often called. For most of them the event is about excessive 
drinking and self-expression (and to experience ‘communitas’). Most of the students begin the festivities 
with ‘kegs and eggs’ at 6:00 am and continue drinking until late at night. Colorful pictures of their 
behavior can be found on Facebook and other social media websites. The activities related to the festival 
are not concentrated in one location, but spread out informally over the Twin Cities. Most of the activities, 
however, are on or near campus and take place inside local bars and in the students’ apartments and 
dorms. There is a plea to make Unofficial an ‘official’, legal event through the organization of concerts or 
parades, like at the New Orleans’ Mardi Gras festival (for this opinion see The Daily Illini: Weber 2012). 
 
Previous Unofficials have got out of hand, resulting in dozens of intoxicated young people, under-aged 
drinking, and even casualties due to accidents directly related to the festival (Editorial 2012; Betz 2012). 
That is why the authorities announced severe restrictions after the first Unofficial was held, which caught 
the authorities by surprise. In 2012, shortly before the start of the event, Tomaz Betz, the director of 
Student Legal Services, wrote in The Daily Illini, the independent student-newspaper:  
 
Underage possession of alcohol, fake ID, disturbing the peace and disorderly conduct are 
all misdemeanors under state statutes that can involve being processed at the Champaign 
County Jail, which means fingerprints and the potential of a permanent criminal record. 
(Betz 2012) 
 
Increased surveillance and a zero tolerance policy have emerged as a result of the authorities’ risk 
management (Schenk 2011). This includes the intensified use of the campus CCTV system. 
 
Liminal Surveillance during Unofficial 
 
The CCTV system 
In early 2010, university authorities adopted a CCTV surveillance system based on Milestone video 
management software on campus. The Milestone software is Internet Protocol (IP) based and enables the 
user to centralize the system: “If security is decentralized on a major university then police cannot use that 
system to its maximum capacity,” Police Chief Barbara O’Connor said in a public interview. “We have 
developed a policy where anyone on campus purchasing a camera system must have it approved by the 
chief of police” (NetworkCentric Security 2010). The reason for the implementation of cameras was 
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campus crime, especially the increasing theft of laptops from the university library, the university’s food 
stores, and sexual assault in university buildings. The implementation of the project began with the 
installation of just a few cameras, but by 2012 the system consisted of about 700 cameras and the idea is 
to expand it further in the years to come. The cameras are owned by the University of Illinois, meaning 
that there are only cameras within or on the exterior of university buildings, not in other parts of the Twin 
Cities. 
 
The university campus CCTV system consists of different types of cameras: 1) fixed cameras permanently 
pointing in a single direction such as toward parking places, entries of cafes, or junctions; 2) outdoor 
business cameras (like dome cameras), installed on the facades of buildings and parking garages; 3) Pan 
Tilt Zoom (PTZ) cameras, which are the most sophisticated ones: digital cameras with zoom options, 360 
pan, controllable via the internet. Side-to-side, up-and-down movement options can be used to watch 
‘hotspots’ on campus such as the bigger parking lots, large student buildings, and squares. 
 
The images recorded by the cameras are stored for 30 days, which is the policy of the University of 
Illinois Police Department. During ‘normal’ days of operation the images of the CCTV system are not 
viewed in real time, because it would be too time-consuming and demand too much staff, as the operator 
of the system explained:  
 
…with so many cameras: how can you do that? You know. You might be able to monitor, 
but even when you monitor half a dozen screens, and put twelve cameras on each one, you 
still need ten people sitting there and ten people waiting to take their place. So it wouldn’t 
work… It really is, and unfortunately, a reactive system. It is very reactive. I mean, I can, 
anybody can pull up a camera and look at it for a few moments or a few seconds or a few 
minutes at a time on a request. But there is a difference between that and sitting and 
concentrate the whole day.  
 
Sometimes, if law enforcement deems the crime serious enough, they temporarily publish footage on 
publicly available social websites, such as YouTube. By doing this they hope to get information from the 
public about the crime. 
 
In other words, in normal situations the system is used for retrospective surveillance: camera images are 
watched after a crime or an atypical situation has been reported. One police officer told the author: “…the 
biggest way we use it, is for after a crime occurs and we wanna see if we have video footages of the 
suspect”. Since the summer of 2011, officers can pull up camera images on their iPads using a system 
called iRa C3. One officer explains:  
 
I have an iPad and the iPad has software that I can [use to] pull up cameras. And we have 
been experimenting with different systems, but these supervisor cars have mobile 
hotspots. So, I can either can get connection through a wireless on campus if I am close to 
a building, you know, or in a building, or I have the mobile hotspot in my car and I can 
pull up the iPad. 
 
Liminal use 
During a local event there is an additional way of using the system, as the police officer told the author 
during an interview:  
 
…as a supervisor, you know, I can use it to check on things. Not so often, you know. You 
really want that capability during something like Unofficial or during a football game 
when it is very, very busy and you don’t have to get out and navigate through those 
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crowds and busy streets. You can just sit there and check on things. Makes it pretty 
convenient.  
 
On top of that, the emergency operations center set up during Unofficial (and for that time only), meant 
that there were two different hierarchies working at the same time:  
 
…the operations center is in charge of all the people working on Unofficial St Patrick’s 
detail… But there is still the regular police site working: regular patrol units, regular 
dispatchers, everything like that. So, there is still answering the calls, you know, that come 
in through 9-1-1 and stuff like that, and we are still dealing with a lot of stuff so that does 
overlap, but it is two separate things going on at one time. 
 
Since 2010, the emergency operations center, where most of the emergency response officials came 
together for this particular event, has been housed in one of the buildings of the Illinois Fire Service 
Institute (IFSI) (Schenk 2011). During the 2012 event, one could find fire fighters, dispatchers, city 
officials, and members of the (privatized) ambulance service gathered in the same room. The presence of 
the police—campus, local, county and state—was dominant: there were police officers from the cities of 
Urbana and Champaign, the county, the State Liquor Control Board, and the University of Illinois Police 
Department. The officials use this room more often during events like football games and for training 
exercises. However, the way they use it during Unofficial is unique. 
 
The whole operation at the time of the event, not including preparations, took about twenty hours: the 
activities in the room started about 6:30 am on Friday and continued until about 2:30 am the following 
day. The officials worked in shifts of eight or twelve hours (depending on their organizational rules), but 
some of them (especially those involved in CCTV surveillance), stayed much longer in the room. Also, 
the numbers of police officers on patrol increased from eleven (the average number of police officers on 
patrol during normal days) to around one hundred for Unofficial, some of them undercover. People who 
visited the room during the day, such as municipality officials, almost immediately responded to the 
CCTV images. Questions such as “Can you zoom in on this or that” were frequently asked. One of the 
visiting officials gave a vague promise: “The system was useful last time; I wish we could install more 
cameras permanently. Please let me know how we can arrange that!” 
 
The projected images of the CCTV cameras and the data from the emergency control room offered 
participants a common focus for discussing strategies and planned actions. In addition to the already 
installed cameras, law enforcement used fifteen additional, temporally installed cameras (called re-
deployable cameras, Waples and Gill 2006) pointing at ‘hotspots’ such as buildings judged to be high risk, 
and the entries of cafes, bars, and restaurants. The screen on the left hand side of the room was used to 
project information from the 9-1-1 Emergency Response Center. In this way the officers could see the 
incoming calls and the positions of the patrol cars. The CCTV images/footage were projected on three 
screens in the middle of the room, taking a central location. The center screen was called the hotspot 
window, since the most important or—at a particular moment in time—the most relevant images (in terms 
of risk and security) were projected there. The two screens on the right hand side of the room projected the 
images of the weather forecast and streams from social media websites, in particular Twitter and 
Facebook. 
 
Surveillance as practice 
During Unofficial it was quite obvious what was considered unwanted behavior, at least to the police 
officers: wearing green shirts or being in a group with ‘Greens’ was enough to attract the police’s 
attention. “Keep an eye on the Greens” was a remark that could often be heard throughout the day. Their 
behavior made the Greens the ‘usual suspects’, as overly watched persons are called in CCTV surveillance 
Boersma: Liminal Surveillance 
Surveillance & Society 11(1/2) 114 
(Phillips 1999; Norris and Armstrong 1999a, 1999b). Here are two vignettes that present examples of 
surveillance practices: 
 
Vignette 1: Inspection of three persons with suspicious behavior in a car. 
For about 30 minutes the focus was on three persons, dressed in green shirts, sitting in a 
car in a parking lot. The dispatchers in the control room consulted the police databases by 
using the car’s license plate to figure out if there was anything suspicious. A police car 
that was driving in the neighborhood stopped at the scene, alerted by the operations center 
personnel. Two patrol officers asked the occupants of the car, two young men, for their 
identification. They hid two bottles of liquor under the front seat of the car, an action that 
was captured by the camera. The operator zoomed in on one of the persons who tried to 
hide his hands. It was unclear what he was doing. One of the boys became aware of the 
big camera (that was temporally installed as part of the increased surveillance during the 
event), and started to point at it. The operator’s reaction: “Of course, cameras are no 
secret, they are big and visible”. One of the officers in the operations center gave the 
officers on patrol some information about the operational picture on the basis of the 
camera images. 
 
Vignette 2: Students hanging out on a balcony. 
During past Unofficial celebrations students threw things off balconies onto the street, 
sometimes aiming at police officers passing by—it became part of their cat and mouse 
game. Not only did they show this kind of maladaptive behavior, students fell off 
balconies because they were too drunk to remain stable. Two years ago a student died 
after he fell from a balcony. This is the reason balconies have become heavily surveilled 
during Unofficial. One student building, the tallest on campus, was under constant 
surveillance during the course of the event. Regularly, the operator zoomed in on windows 
and balconies where there was a lot of green to be seen. If there were too many people on 
balconies, the patrol officers were immediately informed about the risky situation. The 
striking green color of the students’ outfits was an advantage for the police during the 
event. If there was a concentration of green, the operator used the cameras to estimate the 
number of students at one location: “During the last half an hour about at least one 
hundred Greens went into this building” was the message to the officers on patrol. To 
capture groups of students with cameras was more difficult during the darker hours, 
because then the cameras only project black and white images. 
 
The vignettes illustrate how the CCTV system was expanded (with temporal cameras) and employed, as 
well as how the liminal period (i.e. Unofficial) mediated the evolution of the surveillance technology. 
Camera surveillance was focused on behavior that was suspicious or deviant and directly related to 
Unofficial. Sometimes the operator zoomed in on faces in order to capture details of his/her identity. This 
was done not to undertake immediate action, but for later evidence if needed and requested. Because of 
the CCTV in use, the police have more evidence about the behavior of individuals than they would 
otherwise have if there was no operator to target the camera or use the zooming function. The cameras in 
‘normal’ use would not have been able to do this, because those cameras cannot zoom in or out or be 
selective independently; they remain in a particular position. Likewise, the operator sometimes followed 
the officers on patrol with a camera: “Now we have proof of what they are doing, so that we later can say: 
we have proof and not hearsay”. 
 
Social Media in-use in the Control Room 
During Unofficial, CCTV was used in combination with social media surveillance. Watching social media 
websites, in particular Facebook and Twitter, was an integral part of the operation room’s practice. In 
‘normal’ situations the police do not study the social media behavior of students all the time. However, 
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during the event publicly available information on Facebook, Twitter, and PicFog was used intensively by 
the police. In combination with the CCTV images, it created what the police refer to as ‘the operational 
picture of the event’. Information on social media websites was regularly compared with the data of the 
emergency response system and/or with the information from the police on patrol. Not surprisingly, 
students celebrating Unofficial were very active on several social media websites. Vignette 3 gives an idea 
of how social media was used in the control room setting: 
 
Vignette 3: Use of social media websites 
In the early morning there was an incoming call about a fire in an apartment building. The 
local police checked Facebook and Twitter to see if there was any information about the 
fire. And indeed, someone had posted a message: “10am and the drunken stupidity of 
Unofficial St Patrick’s day has already started a fire on campus. There are times I hate this 
town”. Some Tweets mentioned the exact address of the building. For the police this 
additional information was an incentive to undertake action: “For me this is serious 
enough now, I will send my people to the scene” one officer announced. Social media 
became, in addition to CCTV, a source to double-check the incoming information of 9-1-1 
emergency calls. One of the officials explained this to me: “It is useful information, only 
if you use it right. It can be a falsifier for them but not for us”.  
 
By looking at posted pictures and footage on the internet, officers were able to get a feeling for what was 
going on outside. This was useful because the serenity of the emergency control room was in sharp 
contrast to the excitement on the streets and in the dorms. Some examples of Tweets that were projected 
on the screens include: “Gonna be an interesting day. It’s Unofficial St Patrick’s day at UofI. The students 
are already out in green drinking booze on the porches”; “Unofficial St Patrick’s day is considered a battle 
through my eyes… between my body and alcohol. So yeah, it is considered GEAR”; “Celebration of St 
Patricks day. Carefree kids drinking/partying around the clock”. 
 
Watching social media and talking about the images was a way for the officers to kill the time. Every now 
and then the officers joked about the cameras: “Why don’t you go to the street and jump up and down in 
front of them!” By watching social media in combination with camera images they could not only ‘taste’ 
the atmosphere outside but initiate conversations about the event (and past events) to make their work 
bearable during the quieter moments. In other words, social media was a welcoming source of variety in 
their work. The conversations became more and more comradely, particularly in the hours when not much 
was going on in the streets of the Twin Cities, immediately becoming professional if the situation became 
threatening for public safety. 
 
Back to Normal 
Towards the end of Unofficial, when the action was ‘almost over’, the officers kept each other sharp by 
reflecting upon the camera images, telling each other stories about their work and actions during previous 
occasions, still their attention eventually waned. One officer entered the room, late at night, and winked to 
one of the officers in the room: “Drive with me home tonight, and then you will see where the working 
lieutenants are”. And although there was no planned end to the event—after all, the event is unofficial—
most of the student activities visible to the cameras were over by 1 am. A recurrent remark towards the 
end of the evening and at the beginning of the night was: “It is like a regular Friday night now”. 
 
Vignette 4: The banality of surveillance 
Late at night we had dinner in the operations center. The social media footage, the 
projected images of CCTV, and local television news reports fused into a long, cluttered 
image that we eventually experienced as cinema-like. It was as if we—present in the 
operations center—were watching a movie: eating pizza, drinking soda and staring at 
fragments of camera images from an event far away without a clear plot, but fascinating 
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enough to hold our attention because we were, in one way or another, involved in the 
action, like the prison guard at the Panopticon. Halfway through the evening, a student, 
clearly in a state of drunkenness, yelled at the camera of the local television station: “And 
the police gave us a lot of trouble today!” causing general laughter in the operating room. 
The State police officer from Chicago left the room after the last shift. With a wink he 
said to the local police officers: “Stay away from the Greens and see you next year!” A 
local police officer: “So, I don’t have to show up this Monday?” His chief in a direct 
reaction: “Yes of course you have to, Monday it is back to business!” 
 
In those hours the absorption of footage posted on social media websites in combination with staring at the 
CCTV images became like zapping through television channels. Or, to put it more reflectively, the control 
room practice became an integral “…part of the visual repertoire of modern life, embodying a compulsive 
desire to record time and space, in all its banality, in pursuit of something of interest” (Gates and Magnet 
2007: 283). 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
During Unofficial 2012 the police issued 310 tickets, not significantly different than the year before, when 
328 tickets were issued. The numbers: 177 fines for minors in possession of alcohol, 87 for public 
possession of alcohol, 17 for adults allowing under-age kids drinking, 5 for throwing dangerous material, 
3 public urination, 21 other offenses, like carrying open liquor out of premise, sale of alcohol to a minor, 
and the possession of cannabis (source: The University’s Division of Public Safety, 9 March 2012; The 
News Gazette 2012c). University of Illinois students received 116 of the 310 tickets. The authorities 
mentioned in the media that the vast majority of tickets were fines for ‘out-of-towners’ (i.e. students that 
came from other cities to celebrate Unofficial) stressing that those not exposed to the early warnings of 
law enforcement were more likely to violate the announced rules (The News Gazette 2012b, 2012c). 
 
CCTV and social media certainly helped the police to make sense of what was going on in the streets. 
However, it also became clear that the information was often redundant or resulted in overload. There 
were simply too many images for too long a period of time projected on the walls. This was a real 
problem, according to the operator: “…even with trained people watching cameras you only can get 20 
minutes out of it. They are actually monitoring cameras before they just kinda go blind to it”. 
 
From the observations presented above and from the secondary sources it can be concluded that the 
temporarily intensified, liminal surveillance was directly related to the (mis)conducts of students and 
visitors celebrating Unofficial. The event clearly mediated the use of the surveillance technologies. At the 
same time, the use of surveillance technologies was more narrow and intensive during Unofficial than in 
the ‘normal’ situation. In a normal situation CCTV images can be consulted by individual police officers 
(i.e. by using their iPad system) but they are not watched real time by a team of officials, let alone 
projected on large screens in a big control room. CCTV and social media in normal use is for retrospective 
surveillance only. The liminal use of the system during the event has consequences for the surveillance 
practices of the police during Unofficial. And it helps us to better understand the drivers for increased 
surveillance. The multi-dimensional perspective introduced earlier in this paper can make this more 
explicit.  
 
First of all, the time/space dimension of liminal surveillance reveals that the temporal intensive use of 
CCTV and social media in the emergency control room enabled the police to isolate their surveillance and 
patrol related to festival from regular policing activities. In the control room the police could combine the 
CCTV images with other sources of information such as social media websites and share it directly with 
colleagues from different disciplines (ambulance services, fire service) in the room. One officer explained 
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that it was important to “[k]now their names and see the faces”. Also, the control room united various 
disciplines including law enforcement teams to focus on campus safety and crime. 
 
In the second place, the social dimension of liminal surveillance enables us to reflect upon the interaction 
of those who participated in the control room setting. The Unofficial event, with the emergency control 
room temporally in full operation, enabled a smoother and more effective exchange of information 
between different professional disciplines. For the police officers on patrol it meant that they could 
directly (physically or by means of their communication systems) consult the control room—where a team 
of professionals was ready to assist them in their actions and where the CCTV system could be used to 
monitor different locations at one time—and combine it with the information they got from the street. In 
that sense the system functioned as a force multiplier. Also, it gave the professionals the ability to 
experience—in Turner’s terms—communitas, a kind of togetherness and camaraderie that can help them 
to build and sustain good relationships.  
 
In the third place, with the normative dimension we can better understand what were seen as legitimate 
and possible surveillance practices. Liminal surveillance during the event enabled officials to test the 
system in an ‘extreme’ situation: both the operator, who could improve his skills by using the system, and 
the officers in the room, who passively made use of the system, gained better knowledge about what can 
and cannot be done. They could also advocate the use of the CCTV system and seek support for 
expansion: conversations with temporal visitors of the room were important to further promote CCTV. 
The installation of more cameras is a huge investment—as one officer told me “…it is a very expensive 
window”—so the more the police can show what can be done with it, the better it is for them. 
 
Finally, the power dimension sheds light on how the authorities could raise attention to the use of CCTV 
on campus to create public awareness for security, emergency response, and policing practices. Before 
Unofficial and in the aftermath of it, the University of Illinois Police Department was engaged in a debate 
about security, safety, and privacy on campus. In particular, The Daily Illini was an important venue for 
providing the audience an idea of their otherwise more hidden activities and to manipulate public opinion. 
Aaron Landers, one of the department’s police officers, gave a substantial interview to The Daily Illini 
(interview by Quilici 2012a). In a response on the same page, staff writer Morgan Quilici (2012b) stated: 
“For a long time I have looked at police officers in a way that made them seem almost inhuman. They are 
just like us. They have feelings and emotions. They have families”. 
 
After Unofficial, surveillance went back to ‘normal’. However, this observation does not mean that the 
surveillance system did not change at all after the event was over. In fact, the liminal surveillance has a 
legacy: law enforcement convinced the local authorizes that the (CCTV) surveillance techniques have 
added value for their work. The operator told me later that more cameras will be added to the system in 
the years to come. 
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